








This article critically analyses the hermeneutic commitment of Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA). 
In the theoretical framework of IPA, the role of preconceptions and prejudices is consistently downplayed; priority 
is given to the participant’s own words. Paley has argued that IPA’s interpretative phase is always and necessarily 
determined by the researcher’s fore-conceptions, as opposed to the participant’s narrative. I demonstrate that 
IPA’s failure to recognise the importance of an external frame of reference in interpretation may arise from the 
misunderstanding of the method’s hermeneutic underpinnings. I essentially argue that bracketing the researcher’s 
fore-conceptions during the initial phases of IPA is merely an illusion. While it is beyond the scope of this article 
to dispute whether IPA is genuinely phenomenological, my claim ultimately poses a challenge to IPA’s 
phenomenological commitment on its own terms. The article concludes with a proposal to substantially improve 
IPA’s consistency with hermeneutic tradition and its grounding in phenomenological philosophy.      
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Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) is a qualitative research method designed to analyse how 
individuals make sense of lived experiences, such as major transitions in their life or illness experiences. IPA has 
been developed by Jonathan Smith and most comprehensively set out by Smith et al. (2009). The purpose of the 
method is to provide detailed analytical account of lived experiences in the participants’ own terms, rather than to 
conduct an analysis guided by a predefined category system relying on the preconceptions and theoretical 
prejudices of the researcher. According to Smith et al. (2009, p. 32) this criterion makes IPA a phenomenological 
research method. IPA further has a hermeneutic commitment as the authors adhere to the view according to which 
every phenomenological inquiry requires interpretation.  
Although claimed to be phenomenological, IPA is predominantly centred in psychology. Giorgi (2010) argues 
that instead of ‘Phenomenological’, the method should be termed ‘Interpretive Experiential Analysis’ due to its 
questionable affiliation to phenomenological philosophy. Both van Manen (2017) and Zahavi (2019b, pp. 126-
127) have pointed out that although IPA is clearly qualitative, studying lived experiences is not equivalent with 
being phenomenological. Moreover, Zahavi (2019b, pp. 126-128, 2019c) argues that it is not entirely clear how 
the method draws upon phenomenological philosophy: on the one hand, IPA fails to operationalise concepts of 
phenomenological philosophy that would be instrumental for its very purpose, and misinterprets others it actually 
draws from, on the other. IPA’s understanding of bracketing, indeed, shows little resemblance to the Husserlian 
concept of epoché (or bracketing), one of the central elements of Husserl’s phenomenological method. Epoché 
means the suspension of the natural attitude, i.e. the dogmatic belief in the absolute, ‘mind-independent’ existence 
of the world. As Zahavi notes, epoché does not imply careful examination of worldly objects, free from prejudices 
and theoretical preconceptions, in order to let the objects show themselves as what they are (Zahavi, 2019b pp. 
33-34). Epoché provides an opportunity to pay attention to how and why worldly objects show themselves as they 
do. This is when we start realising our own constitutive role in the way in which the objects are revealed and with 
the meaning they have; which ultimately enables the philosophical analysis of the correlative relationship between 
ourselves and the world, between subjectivity and objectivity (Zahavi, 2019a, 2019b, pp. 32-38, 2019c). 
Conversely, to IPA, bracketing means a certain interviewing and transcript analysis technique, where researchers 
access the meaning of the participant’s narrative by temporarily suppressing and silencing their own 
preconceptions on the matter. However, the objective of this article is not to dispute whether IPA’s bracketing 
technique is phenomenological or not, but to problematise the technique’s hermeneutic structure. Paley (2017, 
Ch. 5-6) has argued that IPA’s interpretative phase, as opposed to Smith et al.’s claim (2009, p. 90), never arises 




from the outside. In other words, IPA’s major methodological innovation in empirical research, the bracketing of 
the researcher’s preconceptions during the early stages of the analysis is merely an illusion. Following a brief 
conceptual overview of IPA’s hermeneutic underpinnings, I will demonstrate that the failure to recognise the 
importance of preconceptions may lie in the misinterpretation of the Heideggerian and Gadamerian concepts of 
interpretation. This claim, nonetheless, subsequently poses a challenge to IPA’s phenomenological commitment 
on its own terms. In the final section of the article, I propose some modifications to IPA to resolve this issue and 
substantially improve the method’s grounding in phenomenological philosophy. 
 
IPA and hermeneutics 
 
IPA’s hermeneutic focus draws predominantly, although not exclusively, from Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg 
Gadamer; it does so rather selectively nonetheless. In the theoretical framework of IPA, the role of preconceptions 
and prejudices is consistently downplayed. Fore-conceptions and fore-understandings are portrayed as obstacles 
in the process of interpretation that should better be bracketed off in order to come to a genuine understanding of 
the participants’ own meaning. In the Heideggerian and Gadamerian concepts of interpretation, nevertheless, the 




Heidegger argues that ‘every interpretation which is to contribute some understanding must already have 
understood what is to be interpreted’ (2010, p. 147). Fore-understandings are the precondition of interpretation. 
This follows precisely from Heidegger’s approach to understanding. Heidegger maintains that separation of object 
and subject is misleading as we can only understand both the self and the world in their interconnectedness:  
 
Self and world belong together in the single entity, the Dasein. Self and world are not two beings, like subject and object, or 
like I and thou, but self and world are the basic determination of the Dasein itself in the unity of the structure of being-in-the-
world. (Heidegger, 1988, p. 297)  
 
Heidegger further argues that we are dependent upon one another, and being-in-the-world means being-with-one-
another (Heidegger, 1988, pp. 178, 297-98; 1985, pp. 236-250); ‘being-with remains existentially constitutive for 
being-in-the-world’ (Heidegger, 2010, p. 118). The self, the world and others within form an inseparable unit. 
Pure reasoning in isolation is, therefore, not possible, we can only think about the objects of the world from within 
the world and in relation to others; embeddedness and intersubjectivity are the default characteristic of our 
experiences and consciousness (Moran, 2000, p. 160; Watts, 2011, pp. 22, 51). Moreover, given the temporality 
of Dasein (human existence), understanding is necessarily determined by a particular historical context, the 
cultural heritage of our time (Heidegger, 1988, pp. 22, 169; 2010, pp. 19-20, 369-376; Watts, 2011, pp. 135-137). 
Our initial understanding of the world is second-hand experience; the society we live in, the public world provides 
a ready-made interpretation of things. We are born and socialise into a particular zeitgeist; we are thrown into the 
world (Heidegger, 2010, pp. 131, 169-174). We inherit the knowledge, beliefs and general understanding of the 
world of a given period of time.  
What is important is that, due to this historical embeddedness of Dasein, we always have an inherited, ‘primordial’ 
understanding of the world and its entities that helps us to make sense of worldly objects (Watts, 2011, pp. 43-
45). To demonstrate this, Heidegger points out that ‘we never hear noises or complexes of sound but the creaking 
wagon, the motorcycle … the woodpecker tapping, the cracking fire’. Heidegger calls this ‘hearkening’, a hearing 
that understands, and he notes: ‘it requires a very artificial and complicated attitude in order to hear a pure noise’ 
(Heidegger, 2010, p. 158). Similarly, we do not only see a pair of tires and a tube structure when we look at a 
bicycle, but we instantly know we are looking at a bicycle. In fact, perceiving the rounded shape pair of things as 
tires would already imply a familiarity with the concept of tire. Heidegger argues that we always and instantly 
perceive things we encounter as something that has a function, and interpret them in the context of and through 
the way in which they relate to other entities we already know (Heidegger, 1988, pp. 292-294; van Manen, 2016, 
pp. 107-110). ‘Things at hand are always already understood in terms of a totality of relevance’ (Heidegger, 2010, 
p. 145). Whenever we look at an object, what first appears to us is its possible purpose: the cupboard as something 




on. The functionality, i.e. the possible relatedness of things to other entities is automatically and unconsciously 
disclosed by our pre-existing knowledge of the world. The same applies to the interpretation of statements, 
assertions or judgements in communication (Heidegger, 2010, p. 149). Heidegger refers to this network of pre-
existing knowledge as fore-havings, fore-sights and fore-conceptions: fore-having as the overall, already known 
context in which the thing to be interpreted is involved; fore-sight as our particular approach to or take on the 
matter; and fore-conception as a provisional (or definite) significance or meaning attached to the thing as 
conceived and disclosed in interpretation. The three together constitute the fore-structure of understanding. All 
our perceptions and encounters of things in our environment are grounded in the fore-structure (Heidegger, 2010, 
pp. 144-149; Watts, 2011, pp. 64-68). Watts specifically exemplifies the concept of fore-having with reference to 
psychologists whose fore-having would be their general understanding of human nature (Watts, 2011, p. 68). 
Whenever psychologists analyse a new, yet unknown feature of consciousness, they naturally interpret it against 
the background of what they already know about consciousness.  
Heidegger argues that things not always show themselves as what they are, but in a ‘self-concealing’ manner 
(Moran, 2000, p. 229). Phenomena can be ‘covered up’, and interpretation is, therefore, inevitable: ‘explication 
of phenomena must be opposed to the naïveté of an accidental, immediate and unreflective beholding’ (Heidegger, 
2010, p. 34). Interpretation is the process that makes the relevance of the yet uncovered (‘veiled’) aspects of things 
explicit by appropriating what has already been understood based on our fore-structure. ‘Interpretation is never a 
presuppositionless grasping of something previously given’ (Heidegger, 2010, p. 146). Meaning emerges once we 
come to understand the purpose of something as something, and it becomes intelligible in terms of its functional 
interconnectedness with other entities in our world (Watts, 2011, p. 68; Heidegger, 2010, pp. 146-147). Thus, 
Heidegger argues that understanding is always and inescapably a circular process that nurtures itself from our 
fore-conceptions of phenomena; every new experience and knowledge is grounded in the fore-structure. 
While IPA acknowledges this central role of fore-conceptions in the process of interpretation, Smith et al. urge to 
‘look closely’ at what Heidegger says, and the authors quote the following passage from Being and Time: 
 
Our first, last, and constant task in interpreting is never to allow our … fore-conception to be presented to us by fancies and 
popular conceptions, but rather to make the scientific theme secure by working out the fore-structures in terms of the things 
themselves. (Heidegger, cited in Smith et al., 2009, p. 25)1    
 
Smith et al. conclude that fore-conceptions seem to pose a certain ‘danger’ and present ‘obstacle’ to interpretation; 
‘priority should be given to the new object, rather than to one’s preconceptions’ (Smith et al., 2009, p. 25). Partly 
based on this reading of Heidegger, IPA follows a methodology where researchers are advised to avoid 
interpretation at the early stages of the analysis by bracketing their fore-conceptions, and to take the descriptive 
stance of a naïve listener. Heidegger, indeed, maintains that the task of phenomenology is ‘to let that what shows 
itself be seen from itself, just as it shows itself from itself’ (Heidegger, 2010, p. 32). However, the way in which 
things show themselves is precisely the way in which things are described from one’s perspective grounded in the 
fore-structure: for Heidegger, description is interpretation (Finlay, 2009; Dybel, 2004). First of all, in the passage 
cited by Smith et al., Heidegger does not prescribe a formula for interpretation (‘development of understanding’) 
as a method to be followed e.g. in textual interpretation. Rather, he explicates interpretation with an ontological 
significance as nothing less than the universal functioning of human understanding. Thus, it is perhaps worth 
taking an even closer look at what Heidegger says just a few lines above the earlier passage cited by Smith et al.:   
 
But to see a vitiosum in this circle and to look for ways to avoid it, even to feel that it is an inevitable imperfection, is to 
misunderstand understanding from the ground up (...) What is decisive is not to get out of the circle, but to get into it in the 
right way. The circle of understanding is not a circle in which any random kind of knowledge operates, but it is rather the 
expression of the existential fore-structure of Dasein itself. The circle must not be degraded to a vitiosum, not even to a 
tolerated one. A positive possibility of the most primordial knowledge is hidden in it. (Heidegger, 2010, p. 148)     
 
Secondly, and more significantly, Smith et al.’s interpretation of the passage is misleading. It does not suggest 
that (hypothetically) we should interpret the things ‘in themselves’ and by silencing our fore-understanding 






our fore-understanding in a way in which it most intelligibly discloses and mirrors the significance and relevance 
of the thing in their interconnectedness. How would we know whether we encountered something genuinely new, 
if we approached the thing by bracketing our fore-understanding? Only by analysing every aspect of something 
that shows itself from a particular perspective we can safely declare that it cannot be fully interpreted as something 
we have previously known. But then, if so, nor could we genuinely describe it, we should have to find a name for 
it first.  
The authors refer to the concept of hermeneutic circle throughout the text without getting into it in the right way. 
The hermeneutic circle always starts with Heidegger’s as-structure. Understanding emerges in interpretation once 
something becomes intelligible as something previously known. IPA fails to recognise that the circle necessarily 
starts with one’s own fore-conceptions; it would merely be a hermeneutic vacuum otherwise. The words of the 
text only gain meaning in relation to something; without fore-conceptions there is no interpretation, without 




Gadamer, influenced by Heidegger, has extensively analysed the process of understanding and how meaning is 
constituted during interpretation. In agreement with Heidegger, Gadamer argues that interpretation necessarily 
relies on our fore-conceptions; we cannot ‘extinct’ our own self when listening to someone or reading a text. What 
is crucial according to Gadamer is to stay aware of our own biases, to foreground them and to constantly question 
the validity of our fore-understanding in relation to the new content. This awareness does not mean that we should 
completely ignore and shut our preconceptions out; what is needed is sensitivity ‘to the text’s alterity’ (Gadamer, 
2004, pp. 268-273). For Gadamer, understanding is always dialogical: we come to understand the world in 
conversation with others. He explored the ways in which we rely on our inherited fore-knowledge and worldview, 
and simultaneously open up for different interpretations by others, which he called the fusion of horizons (Moran, 
2000, pp. 248-252). Husserl referred to horizon as all the possible aspects and features of an object that can be 
perceived from a particular perspective at a given time (Moran, 2000, pp. 161-163). Gadamer applied the concept 
of horizon to the thinking mind: ‘a person who has a horizon knows the relative significance of everything within 
this horizon’ (Gadamer, 2004, p. 301). Horizon in Gadamerian sense is perhaps best described as one’s view and 
general understanding of phenomena and their context at a given time, the totality of possibly relevant fore-
conceptions. To understand one another and to come to a common understanding during conversation, we 
transpose ourselves into the other person. ‘Understanding is always the fusion of these horizons’ (Gadamer, 2004, 
p. 305). Every interpretation is changing of views, and neither the imposition nor the abandonment of our own 
over what has to be interpreted. In conversation we bring our preconceptions, opinions ‘into play’ and put them 
‘at risk’ (Gadamer, 2004, pp. 298-299, 398). Gadamer notes that the ‘common dictum’ is neither mine, nor my 
partner’s, it is always something new: ‘old and new are always combining into something of living value, without 
either being explicitly foregrounded from the other’ (Gadamer, 2004, pp. 388, 305). To introduce the Gadamerian 
concept of interpretation, Smith et al. cite the following passage from Truth and Method: 
 
It is necessary to keep one’s gazes fixed on the things throughout all the constant distractions that originate in the interpreter 
himself. A person who is trying to understand a text is always projecting. He projects a meaning for the text as a whole as soon 
as some initial meaning emerges in the text ...  Working out this fore-projection, which is constantly revised in terms of what 
emerges as he penetrates into the meaning, is understanding what is there. (Gadamer, cited in Smith et al., 2009, p. 26)   
 
Unfortunately, the ellipsis in the middle of the citation indicates the omission of a sentence that is at the heart of 
both Gadamer’s reasoning and the argument of this article: ‘Again, the initial meaning emerges only because he 
is reading the text with particular expectations in regard to a certain meaning’ (Gadamer, 2004, p. 269). According 
to the authors’ interpretation of the passage, ‘one may only really get to know what the preconceptions are once 
the interpretation is underway’ (Smith et al., 2009, p. 26). Smith (2007) argues that understanding may actually 
work from the text to the fore-structure. Interpretation is, as has been discussed, an automatic and unconscious 
process. As the object of interpretation, it is, necessarily, the text that triggers and activates our fore-conceptions, 
yet understanding works the other way around. No one can learn and, all of a sudden, understand the English 
language by simply gazing at the front page of the Guardian. With the next citation the authors’ aim is to 





Every revision of the fore-projection is capable of projecting before itself a new projection of meaning; rival projects can 
emerge side by side until it becomes clearer what the unity of meaning is; interpretation begins with fore-conceptions that are 
replaced by more suitable ones. This constant process of new projection constitutes the movement of understanding and 
interpretation. (Gadamer, cited in Smith et al., 2009, p. 26) 
 
Our horizon, our filter is constantly changing and upgrading during interpretation; ideas pop up and go. When we 
are reading a text, the interpretation of the parts we have already read impacts upon the interpretation of 
forthcoming ones. Not only that, the initial bits might as well gain different meaning following the interpretation 
of the text as a whole. Certain parts, initially obscure, gain meaning through the interpretation of others, and 
ultimately, of the whole, and vice versa. What is decisive is that the very first point of departure that determines 
the initial direction of the entire interpretative process is always grounded in our fore-understanding and not in 
the text itself. Based on the next citation the authors draw the conclusion that preconceptions can ‘hinder’ 
interpretation (Smith et al., 2009, p. 26). 
 
A person trying to understand something will not resign himself from the start to relying on his own accidental fore-meanings, 
ignoring as consistently and stubbornly as possible the actual meaning of the text until the latter becomes so persistently audible 
that it breaks through what the interpreter imagines it to be. Rather a person trying to understand a text is prepared for it to tell 
him something … But this kind of sensitivity involves neither neutrality with respect to content nor the extinction of one’s 
self, but the foregrounding and appropriation of one’s own fore-meanings and prejudices. The important thing is to be aware 
of one’s own bias, so that the text can present itself in all its otherness and thus assert its own truth against one’s own fore-
meanings. (Gadamer, cited in Smith et al., 2009, p. 26) 
 
Gadamer by no means censures or proposes to disregard our preconceptions, on the contrary, to foreground and 
appropriate them. IPA, however, opts for the former. Gadamer specifically notes that interpretation inescapably 
involves prejudices, but ‘it is neither possible, necessary, nor desirable that we put ourselves within brackets’ 
(Gadamer, 1979, p. 152). Moreover, he argues: 
 
To try to escape from one’s own concepts in interpretation is not only impossible, but manifestly absurd. To interpret means 
precisely to bring one’s own preconceptions into play so that the text’s meaning can really be made to speak for us. (Gadamer, 
2004, p. 398)    
 
Gadamer’s concept of prejudice is analogous to Heidegger’s fore-structure, with no negative connotation 
attached. Prejudices are pre-judgements, fore-conceptions that are a function of history and tradition, therefore 
ineliminable (Moran, 2000, p. 278). Our understanding is inescapably influenced by our past; Gadamer refers to 
this as history of effect (Gadamer, 2004, p. 299). Although often operate unconsciously, prejudices ‘constitute the 
initial directedness of our whole ability to experience. Prejudices are biases of our openness to the world. They 
are simply conditions … whereby what we encounter says something to us’ (Gadamer, 1977, p. 9). We get ‘struck’ 
by and start paying attention to the text alterity only when we encounter inconsistency, i.e. when our hidden 
prejudices fail us and become questionable (Gadamer, 2004, p. 294). Thus ‘provoked’ by the text we are put in a 
position to identify a so far unnoticed prejudice and denounce it as such, whereby it becomes ‘authentically’ ours, 
part of our explicit interpretative toolkit (Gadamer, 1979, pp. 157-158). We now also have the opportunity to 
suspend its validity and foreground it, which neither means silencing, nor casting it aside, but considering it in 
contrast to the new opinion: ‘only by being given full play is it able to experience the other’s claim to truth and 
make it possible for him to have full play himself’ (Gadamer, 2004, pp. 298-299). Thus, Smith is right by 
suggesting there are prejudices we are not aware of and have no control over, and which we may better understand 
by engaging with the text (Smith et al., 2009, pp. 25-27; Smith, 2007). But, then, how are we to silence them 
before they take effect, and more importantly, for what purpose? Precisely by hidden prejudices being provoked, 
confronted, hence revealed we start questioning and understanding ourselves in relation to phenomena, and 
simultaneously opening up to yet unrecognised aspects of the world. Prejudices are all we have, really, which we 
constantly revalidate and reconfigure over time. This is why Gadamer maintains: ‘It is not so much our judgements 
as it is our prejudices that constitute our being’ (Gadamer, 1977, p. 9).  
It is irrelevant whether a prejudice is correct or incorrect, but the relevant question is whether it is 




provisional, their credentials are subject to future challenge. It is ‘temporal distance’ that helps to rule out arbitrary 
prejudices that do not become confirmed during the ‘passage of time’. Furthermore, there is a dialectic relationship 
between the ‘old’ fore-conception and the ‘new’ that replaces it. The ‘new’ will always need the ‘old’ to know by 
what and in what it is opposed or superimposed (Gadamer, 2004, p. 298; 1978, pp. 156-158). For this very reason, 
IPA researchers would not be able to test the validity of the theoretical interpretation attached to their findings 
without embedding it in a conceptual framework. 
 
Phases of IPA and hermeneutic shortcomings   
 
Parking ‘hobby horses’ - data collection   
 
The most recommended data collection method to conduct IPA is in-depth interview. The interviewees should 
have the opportunity to provide a rich and detailed first-person account of their experiences, stories and concerns. 
According to the guidance, during the interview phase of the project:  
 
You are leaving your research world and coming round the hermeneutic circle to the participant’s world … By focusing on 
attending closely to your participant’s words, you are more likely to park or bracket your own pre-existing concerns, hunches 
and theoretical hobby horses. It is not that you should not be curious and questioning; it is that your questioning at this phase 
of the project should all be generated by attentive listening to what your participant has to say.  (Smith et al., 2009, p. 64) 
 
First, disregarding our fore-havings would be very complicated, as listening to someone, making sense of one’s 
words inevitably triggers the activation of our fore-understandings of what we are listening to. In hermeneutic 
terms, to answer the question ‘What do they mean by this?’ we are trying to create an intelligible sequence of 
what we just heard by appropriating, and against the background of, our fore-knowledge. No matter how 
experienced they are, psychologists are not psychics; trying to understand implies interpretation, and interpretation 
is the appropriation of fore-conceptions. Second, as has been argued, understanding is always a fusion of horizons, 
ours and our partner’s horizon, it is never the abandonment of our own. We never leave our world in interpreting 
someone, on the contrary we try to ‘transpose’ ourselves into the situation. Gadamer underlines that the emphasis 
in the process of ‘transposing ourselves’ is precisely on ourselves: 
 
If we put ourselves in someone else’s shoes, for example, then we will understand him - i.e. become aware of the otherness, 
the indissoluble individuality of the other person - by putting ourselves in his position. (Gadamer, 2004, p. 304) 
 
We surely disregard ourselves in the sense that we do not expect others to interpret certain experiences as we do, 
but their unique interpretation is precisely unique in relation and in comparison to ours. Moreover, our research 
world, our experiences and professional knowledge are all constitutive of our otherness, i.e. our horizon. Even if 
we do not explicitly activate and operationalise a specific experience or concept relating to the topic when 
interpreting our partner, they are still irreversibly and inseparably part of our whole being; our cognitive and 
interpretative capacity, the filter through which we are trying to understand our partner.  
Smith et al. argue that ‘it can sometimes be useful’ to collect extra data after the interview, such as participant 
observation to understand the local context and activities, all of which are helpful to conceptualise the interview 
and develop the analysis (Smith et al., 2009, p. 73). In other words, the authors essentially advise the researcher 
to gain some fore-understandings in relation to the interviewee in order to facilitate the subsequent interpretation 
process. It is not entirely clear why this is not an authoritative prescription and to be conducted prior to the 
interview; failing to collect such data would probably alter the outcome of the interpretation.  
 
Reducing the ‘noise’ - reading, noting, descriptive comments 
 
IPA’s initial phase should be ‘descriptive’ with an ‘exploratory’ focus ‘close to the participant’s explicit meaning’ 
rather than being interpretative (Smith et al., 2009, pp. 82-88). This section will demonstrate why IPA is 
inescapably interpretative from the outset. According to the authors, in the first phase of the analysis, the 





Most striking observations about the transcript in a notebook, in order to help you to bracket them off for a while. Sometimes 
the process of beginning analysis is accompanied by a feeling of being overwhelmed by ideas and possible connections - it 
can help to reduce the level of this noise by recording it somewhere, thus allowing your focus to remain with the data. You 
can always come back to these notes later, safe in the knowledge that your first impressions have been captured. (Smith et al., 
2009, p. 82)   
 
Conversely, the researcher is simultaneously asked to make ‘exploratory notes’ of ‘anything of interest within the 
transcript’, and ‘produce a comprehensive and detailed set of notes and comments on the data’ (Smith et al., 2009, 
p. 83).  
Interesting in terms of what? Comprehensive as to what kind of aspect? Nothing is interesting in itself. Interesting 
always means interesting in terms of something. The authors help by adding that interesting here means interesting 
in terms of whether something helps ‘to identify specific ways by which the participant talks about, understands 
and thinks about an issue’ (Smith et al., 2009, p. 83); i.e. interesting in terms of the respective research question. 
To decide whether something the participant says is interesting in these terms, the researcher must understand 
what specific ways of understanding an issue means. To put it simply, we have to know what we are searching 
for. As Gadamer notes: ‘We can understand the text only when we have understood the question to which it is an 
answer’ (Gadamer, 2004, p. 363).  Since the aim is to identify and reveal interesting bits about the specific ways 
by which the participant understands an issue, the researcher must have a fore-understanding of what the ways of 
understanding an issue are in general. We would not be able to find something interesting in the transcript in terms 
of how the participant understands an issue if we did not already have a concept of understanding. Whenever we 
formulate a research- or interview question, we must always already have a grasp of the subject matter. In the very 
first pages of Being and Time (see also Moran, 2000, p. 236), Heidegger explains the hermeneutic structure of a 
question:  
 
Every questioning is a seeking. Every seeking takes its lead beforehand from what it sought. Questioning is a knowing search 
for beings in their thatness and whatness. The knowing search can become an investigation, as the revealing determination of 
what the question aims at ... As a seeking, questioning needs prior guidance from what it seeks. The meaning of being must 
therefore already be available to us in a certain way. We intimated that we are always already involved in an understanding of 
being ... This average and vague understanding of being is a fact.  (Heidegger, 2010, p. 4)   
 
Thus, when we are reading the transcript, we are trying to find interesting bits, comments that refer to, and might 
be relevant as to how the participant understands an issue in relation to our general, ‘vague’ understanding of the 
concept of understanding. The ‘noises’ we hear while reading the transcript and our ‘striking observations’ the 
authors suggest to bracket are precisely the manifestations of our revelation and identification of something as 
interesting the participant said in terms of our own concepts of understanding in general. These are the cognitive 
alerts of when something the participant says becomes intelligible in terms of our understanding of understanding. 
The question arises: how could we find something interesting in the transcript if we tried to ignore and shut out 
our own concepts only in terms of which something, anything can be interesting? What is essentially asked from 
the researcher at this stage is to try not to interpret the text, but meanwhile to find its interesting bits. With the 
bicycle example: on the one hand, the researcher is asked not to see the bicycle, but write descriptive and 
exploratory comments about how fast it is, its colour, the shape of its saddle, the handlebar, on the other. In other 
words, the researcher is simultaneously asked not to interpret the transcript but make sense of it, which is an 
oxymoron.  
Notwithstanding, to avoid interpretation seems less and less achievable when moving ahead with the project. Each 
descriptive phase, except the first, is preceded by the interpretative phase of the previous case(s) when the task is 
specifically to render theoretical concepts to the participant’s account (Smith et al., 2009, pp. 88-106). 
 
Inspired by what, exactly? - basis of conceptual comments 
 
In IPA’s interpretative phase, the researchers are finally allowed to let their fore-conceptions come to light, and 
interpret the transcript at a conceptual level, against the background of their psychological knowledge, 
professional experiences and pre-understanding. However, the authors’ comment shows a fundamental 




and arose from, attending to the participant’s words, rather than being imported from the outside’ (Smith et al., 
2009, p. 90). 
No interpretation arises from the text itself; it is not our first-person account of our own experiences, but someone 
else’s. We are external to the text and it does not talk to us unless we import and transpose ourselves into it. We 
might gain an understanding of the participant’s understanding of things, yet it would be inescapably based on 
our external, imported fore-conceptions. Our emerging conception of the participant’s understanding may differ 
from our initial fore-conceptions in this regard, it would necessarily arise from our own fore-understanding 
nonetheless, and not of the participant’s. For this very reason, two IPA researchers’ independent interpretation of 
the same transcript would hardly ever result in identical findings (Paley, 2017, Ch. 6; Brocki and Wearden, 2006; 
Lopez and Willis, 2004). This follows from both the concept of hermeneutic circle and the fusion of horizons.        
 
Smith often refers to his own study (1999) on women’s identity development during pregnancy to demonstrate 
how IPA works, and simultaneously provides an excellent example of how interpretation (and hidden prejudices) 
functions (Smith et al., 2009, pp. 163-175; Smith, 2007, 2004). At that time, ‘prompted by the philosophical 
literature’, Smith was interested in personal identity, and adopted his frame of reference and the interview schedule 
accordingly; initially with no reference to significant others as he had been ‘so preoccupied with the woman’s 
relation with herself!’ (Smith, 2007). Foregrounding this framework, Smith was interviewing the women and 
reading their diaries with expectations in regard to this particular frame of reference. Being alert to the text alterity, 
Smith was, however, ‘struck’ by the fact that the participants often referred to their significant others during the 
data collection. Smith realised that his framework proved to be ‘too individualistic’ and, to some extent, 
insufficient, since the women’s constant references to their significant others did not resonate and were ‘not fitting 
with it’ (Smith, 2007). In other words, the women’s references did not make sense or become intelligible against 
the background of Smith’s initial framework. This prompted Smith to consult with literature in the new area, and 
this is how he encountered the work of Georg Herbert Mead, who opened up a whole new world. Mead’s work 
proved to be ‘an extremely useful source’ (Smith et al., 2009, p. 166): the women’s references to significant others 
sounded as something highly intelligible in the light of Mead’s concept, the relational self (Smith, 2004, 2007). 
Smith wonders whether when his ‘old’, insufficient fore-understanding occurred that was eventually replaced by 
a ‘new’, more suitable one (Smith, 2007). Gadamer argues that ‘the nature of the hermeneutical experience is not 
that something is outside and desires admission. Rather, we are possessed by something and precisely by means 
of it we are opened up for the new, the different’ (Gadamer, 1977, p. 9). Thus, there are, perhaps, further pressing 
questions regarding Smith’s analysis: 
1) Would Smith have ever been struck by the women’s references to significant others if he had not 
developed a too individualistic framework and, subsequently, had not been too preoccupied with the 
women’s relation with themselves? 
2) Would the need for a ‘new’ concept have ever occurred in the absence of the ‘old’? (Only in terms of 
which the ‘new’ proved to be new and superior.) 
3) Would Smith have ever associated the references to significant others with the concept of relational self 
if he had not read Mead?  
4) What would have Smith been struck by if he had started his analyses based on Mead’s work from the 
outset? 
and most importantly: 
5) Where is bracketing in this analysis? 
 
In evaluating how IPA is utilised in practice, Brocki and Wearden (2006) have found that interview questions 
were often designed on the basis of a particular theoretical framework or existing writings. Brocki and Wearden 
note that such enquiries, being already targeted, may impact upon the information provided by the participants. 
According to the authors’ findings, ‘it seems unlikely’ that IPA researchers could initiate a project without 








Perspectives of interpretation 
 
In designing IPA, Smith et al.’s purpose was to create a method which is ‘able to capture the experiential and 
qualitative, and which could still dialogue with mainstream psychology’ (Smith et al., 2009, p. 4). How could a 
method whose organising principle is to bracket all theoretical fore-conceptions and professional experiences 
dialogue with mainstream psychology, or with any discipline whatsoever? Although illusionary, the ‘naïve 
listener’ stance of IPA, free from external or imported theoretical concepts, has been tailored only to the initial 
steps of the analysis (Smith et al., 2009, p. 64). Similarly to other research methods, IPA’s ultimate purpose is to 
produce a comprehensive, generalised and conceptual interpretation of its research findings. If the sole purpose 
was to reveal the participants’ interpretation of their experiences in their own terms, as Giorgi (2010) pointed out, 
the easiest way to achieve this would be to ask the participants to describe and interpret their experiences 
themselves. Such findings would hardly be of any scientific interest nonetheless. According to Smith, a ‘good’ 
IPA analysis provides an insightful, theory informed interpretation of its findings grounded in psychology (Smith, 
2011, 2004).  
There is, however, no right or wrong way of conducting IPA, researchers are urged to be innovative in the way 
they approach it (Smith et al, 2009, p. 80). IPA prescribes an analysis that reflects the individual view and 
interpretation of the researcher. Moreover, as has been argued, whatever the researchers find interesting to 
comment on at the very early, ‘descriptive’ stage of the data analysis is determined by their subjective judgement. 
In the absence of guidance, the conceptualisation of findings entirely depends on the choice, the qualification and 
the experience of the researcher, and the body of literature reviewed. Thus, the initial target of IPA, i.e. to disclose 
the participants unique interpretation of their experiences would necessarily result in a plethora of possible 
interpretation depending on the uniqueness of the researchers themselves. Both Giorgi (2010, 2011) and Paley 
(2017) have pointed out that the lack of specific guidance in terms of an objective interpretation of the research 
findings, a comprehensive frame of reference may put the replicability of the research and its overall scientific 
merit at risk. 
It is notable that IPA provides for secondary, theory driven questions (Smith et al., 2009, p.  48), e.g. to what 
extent ‘theory y’ can explain the research findings. It is not clear why this requirement is optional. If the very 
purpose of the interpretative phase is to render a corresponding psychological concept to the emerging themes, 
why is it not an authoritative requirement for researchers to familiarise themselves with the relevant psychological 




Notwithstanding, why would a method that claims to be hermeneutic phenomenological not take its point of 
departure from phenomenological philosophy at the interpretative stage from the outset? IPA is clearly committed 
to intersubjectivity and acknowledges that sense-making is determined by its embeddedness (Larkin et al., 2011, 
2006). Smith et al. note, ‘Because Dasein’s experience is understood to be an in-relation-to to phenomenon, it is 
not really a property of the individual per se’ (Smith et al., 2009, p. 29). However, the authors argue that 
individuals can give us a ‘unique perspective’ of their experiences. This approach would fall short in 
phenomenological terms, even though the final stage of the analysis provides for a psychological interpretation. 
As researchers committed to phenomenology, not only would we like to see what someone’s unique understanding 
of certain phenomena is, but also how this understanding emerges. What is needed is precisely an inquiry into the 
‘in-relation-to’; i.e. what (fore-)structures are shaping that unique understanding, and what factors are shaping the 
structures themselves. This is the very mission of (hermeneutic) phenomenology, for the purpose of which it offers 
an extensive conceptual support. IPA should not ignore the assertions of the very discipline or, to use a Schutzian 
term, the ‘stock of knowledge’ (Schutz, 1972, pp. 78-83) that forms the conceptual basis of its approach. 
Grounding IPA’s interpretative phase in phenomenological philosophy would arguably be more effective, rather 
than reflecting upon random psychological concepts, depending on the respective topic and the researcher’s 
individual choice. For example, Berger and Luckmann (1967) have expanded Mead’s work, and developed a 
comprehensive phenomenological frame of reference concerning the role of significant others in shaping identity. 
Notwithstanding, an introduction to phenomenology is clearly beyond the scope of this article; the works of Zahavi 




Larkin et al. (2011) argue that bracketing guarantees an open-minded approach to qualitative research. Again, 
ignoring the theoretical framework whose very purpose is to conceptualise how we make sense of experiences 
while analysing how participants make sense of experiences would hardly serve that purpose; it would rather 
hinder the analysis (Zahavi, 2019a, 2019b, 2019c) and contradict hermeneutic tradition (Giorgi, 2010, 2011; 
Lopez and Willis, 2004). Zahavi notes that applying certain interviewing techniques or bracketing is not 
constitutive of a phenomenological method, but the employment of a comprehensive theoretical framework 
conceptualising the participant’s ‘relation to itself, to the world, and to others’ (Zahavi, 2019b, p. 137). Every 
interpretative analysis requires an explicit and appropriate frame of reference from which the interpretation can 
take off (Giorgi, 2010, 2011; Lopez and Willis, 2004). Irrespective of how many times IPA researchers read and 
reread the transcript, how close they get to the participants’ words and how attentively listen during the interview, 
the analysis will ultimately fail or succeed depending on how well-equipped they are in terms of theory: 
‘Understanding comes neither from a lot of talking, nor from busy listening around. Only one who already 
understands is able to listen’ (Heidegger, 2010, p. 159). 
 
Conclusion 
It cannot be said that interpretation arises from the participants’ account, since interpretation is always the 
appropriation of fore-conceptions. The participant’s account gains meaning only when it becomes intelligible in 
terms of a particular frame of reference. In its current form, IPA leaves the interpretation to the researchers’ own 
choice; any given IPA research is ultimately determined by the researchers’ pre-existing psychological knowledge 
and professional experience throughout the analysis. A phenomenological focus that consistently draws from 
phenomenological philosophy would be instrumental for IPA’s purpose. Instead of grounding the method in 
psychology, IPA should foreground phenomenological philosophical concepts, and interpret the transcript 
accordingly. This approach would not only show more consistency with hermeneutic traditions, but also make 
IPA a truly phenomenological analysis. This is not to say that findings could not be consulted with pre-existing 
psychological research informed by, or relevant to, the respective concepts of phenomenological philosophy. If 
IPA took the Heideggerian and Gadamerian concepts of interpretation seriously, the method would not only ‘re-
evaluate’ the application of bracketing (Smith et al.2009, p. 25), but drop it.  
 
Notes 
1 Smith et al. use the 1962 translation of Being and Time. 
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